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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

TffiSTATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff -Appellant,
No.

vs.

20066

DARREN D. EARL,
Defendant-Respondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an interlocutory appeal

by the State of Utah from

an Order of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Juab
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen
presiding, granting the defendant-respondent's Motion to suppress
certain items of evidence seized by a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper
fran the defendant's motor vehicle.

DISPOSITION
The Defendant-Respondent,

IN LOWER COURT
Darren D. Earl, hereinafter referred

to as the "Defendant" was arrested on May 4, 1984, by a Utah Highway
Patrol Trooper and charged with the Third Degree Felony of possession
of a controlled substance, marijuana, with the intent to distribute
for value, contrary to Section 58-37-8 1(a) (ii) U.C.A. 1953 as airended.
The defendant was bound over to the Fourth Judicial District
Court for arraignment after a preliminary hearing before the Justice
of the Peace in and for Nephi Precinct, Juab County. After arraignment before the District Court, the Defendant filed a Motion to
-1-

Suppress certain large bags of marijuana seized from the trunk of
the Defendant's motor vehicle. A hearing was held before the
District Court on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress on May 24,
1984. After the hearing the State of Utah and the

Defendant each

submitted Memorandum of Law with respect to their positions. On
June 14, 1984, the District Court entered its Order Granting Defendant's
Motion to Suppress Evidence, from which this appeal is taken.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant-State of Utah seeks to have this Honorable Supreme
Court reverse the Order of the lower Court granting the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress, thereby

permitting the admission of those

certain items of evidence seized from the trunk of the defendant's
motor vehicle at the trial of the defendant for violation of Utah's
Controlled Substances Act.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Darren D. Earl, is charged with the Third Degree
Felony Offense of possession of a controlled substance, marijuana,
with intent to distribute for value; contrary to Section 58-37-8
I

(a) (ii) U.C.A. 1953 as amended.

The charge originates from

an incident that occurred on May 4, 1984, within Juab County, Utah.
During the afternoon of that day Trooper Paul V. Mangel son,
an experienced seventeen year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol was
northbound on Temporary 1-15 between Levan and Nephi. While traveling
he observed a motor vehicle parked approximately one hundred fifty feet
off the highway on a dirt road.
the vehicle in that it was

The officer became suspicious of

parked in a flood area, and the occupant

of the vehicle payed very close attention to the activities of the
officer as he drove past him.

The officer then observed the vehicle

pull onto the highway. The officer then made a U-turn and pulled
in behind the subject vehicle. The officer then followed the subject
vehicle for a period of time, during which time the vehicle was
only driven at a speed of 35 and 40 miles per hour, and did weave
from side to side within its lane of traffic. Based upon these
observations the officer pulled the subject vehicle over to the
side of the road approximately four miles south of Nephi ( T-5,6 ) .
Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the driver,
who he identified as Darren D. Earl, from his Utah driver's license.
The officer requested a registration for the vehicle from the defendant,
since the defendant had a Utah driver's license and the vehicle had
a Wisconsin plates on it. The. defendant was not able to producea registration, and he indicated that he had leased the vehicle in Tuscon,
Arizona, but he was also unable to produce a lease agreement for the
vehicle. The officer then requested that the defendant accompany the
officer to his car so that he could make further inquiry concerning
the ownership of the vehicle on his radio. While in the officer's
vehicle the defendant became very nervous and suddenly he jumped out of
the officer's car and started for his vehicle. The officer then jumped
out of his car and caught the defendant prior to his reaching his vehicle.
He then placed him under custodial arrest for failure to produce a
registration or proof of ownership for the vehicle, and handcuffed him and
placed him back in the patrol car (T6-8 ) .
Trooper Mangelson upon first coming in contact with the defendant
had detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from the interior of the
vehicle (T-6) . The officer inquired of the defendant

concerning the

smell and the defendant responded that there were a couple of joints
of marijuana in the car, probably in a Levi jacket laying on the

seat of the vehicle

(T-7) .

After returning the defendant to his patrol car and upon the
arrival of a back-up officer,

Sergeant Sterling Christensen, Trooper

Mangelson returned to the defendant's vehicle and searched the interior
of the passenger compartment, where he found a

fully loaded pistol

on the driver's side floorboard, a cellophane bag containing a white
substance which in the opinion of Trooper Mangelson was
paraphanelia

cocaine, and

for the use of cocaine. Trooper Mangelson did not

find any marijuana in the passenger compartment of the vehicle bat did
find seme strong air freshners

(T8-9).

After seizing the items in the defendant's vehicle, Trooper
Mangelson returned to the patrol car and informed the defendant he
was also being charged with possession of a loaded firearm in a
vehicle

and illegal possession of a controlled substance (T-10) .

Since the defendant had been placed under custodial arrest the
officers pursuant to Utah Highway Patrol policy requested a wrecker
to tow the defendant's vehicle into Nephi for

safekeeping.

Prior

to the vehicle being taken to the storage yard, it was towed to the
Juab County Public Safety Building for a written inventory to be
made of the contents of the vehicle

(T 10,11) .

It is written Utah Highway Patrol Policy for a written inventory
to be made of the contents of any vehicle taken to any police parking
lot, impound lot or to any commercial storage lot

(R47,48) . Upon

arrival at the Juab County Public Safety Building a written inventory
of the contents of the defendant's vehicle was made

(R 49) . Upon

opening the trunk to the vehicle an extremely strong odor of marijuana
was detected.

Contained in the trunk were two green garbage bags tied at
-4-

the top and a brown leather duffel bag. Contained in the two
green garbage bags was thirty-three pounds of packaged marijuana
(T12,13 ) .
Prior to conducting the inventory search the officers involved
discussed the possibility of obtaining a Search War ant . When they
determined that the county attorney and both Justices of the Peace,
located in Nephi were out of town, at the time, they came to the conclusion that they would be following correct police and search procedure
to conduct the inventory search as outlined in the written highway
patrol policy and procedures (T27,28).
The items contained in the trunk of the vehicle driven by the
defendant were the subject of the defendant's Motion to Supress, which
was granted by the lower court, and which is the basis for this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE SEARCH OF THE TRUNK OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS LAWFUL,
AND ITEMS SEIZED PURSUANT TO THAT SEARCH MAY BE USED AS EVIDENCE,
AND

THE LOWER COURTERRED IN SUPPRESSING THEM.
The case before the Court deals with the warrantless inventory

search of the trunk of a leased vehicle, after the custodial arrest
of the defendant for failure to produce registration or proof of
ownership for the vehicle, possession of a loaded firearm in a vehicle
and illegal possession of a controlled substance, cocaine. The search
resulted in the seizure of thirty-three pounds of packaged marajuana,
contained in two plastic garbags bags, and the charging of the defendant
with the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute for value.
-5-

This Court and other Courts across the country have consistently
held that the same constitutional expectations of privacy as in a
person's hone are not accorded an automobile because its use necessarily
exposes it to great intrusion, therefore, a lesser expectation of
privacy.
The U.S. Supreme Court early recognized that because a motor vehicle
may be capable of being moved before a warrant can be obtained, that
special considerations must be applied in determining the validity
of vehicle searches. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) .
The Court in Carroll applied two general standards for dispensing
with the need to obtain a warrant when probable cause was present. The
first was the mobility of the vehicle and the second the iirpracticability
of obtaining a Search Warrant under the circumstances.
This Court has adopted the position that where a vehicle retains
a reasonable degree of mobility, and there is probable

cause to

believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime, a
search of the vehicle may be made without a warrant. See State v. Limb,
581 P. 2d 142 (Utah-1978) and State v . Criscola

21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d

517 (1968) . This Court has also approved the seizure of an automobile
and its removal to the police station for a more convenient search
Where the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle. See,
State v

Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405, 503 P.2d 8 48 (1972).

The U.S. Supreme Court in the recent case of United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) held that where police officers had probable
cause to believe that a

trunk of a vehicle contained narcotics the

Carroll rule applied and the search of the trunk and subsequent search
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of a zippered leather pouch in the trunk in which cash and narcotics were
found was a lawful search, The Court concluded that an automobile
search could go beyond the search and seizure of the vehicle and could
include containers

in the vehicle based on probable cause to

believe that the vehicle contained contraband and that the container
was capable of containing it.
With respect to inventory searches, the U.S. Supreme Court has
approved the seizure and admission into evidence of items found in
plain view

during a protective effort to secure a vehicle otherwise

in police custody; see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968),
ar i

^

Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) . Inventory searches

after impound have also been upheld including closed containers; see
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
This Court has also upheld routine inventory searches of a
vehicle which took place subsequent to the arrest of the driver;
see State v. Criscola,
v. Romero, 624 P. 2d
stated:

21 Utah 2 n d 272, 444 P. 2 d

517 (1968) and State

699 (Utah 1981) . This Court in Rcmero at page 701

" The law is well established that warrantless searches of

impounded vehicles for the benign purpose of protecting the police
and the public from danger, avoiding police liability for lost or
stolen property, and protecting the owner's property, are permitted
by the Fourth Amendment."
Applying the above law to the facts of the present case, it is
clear that the warrantless search of the defendant's trunk can be
justified under two different principles. One

being that from the

facts present there was sufficient probable cause for Trooper Mangelson
to search the trunk for marijuana • Mangelson had detected an extremely

-7-

strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle, but no marijuana
was found in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, although air
freshners were found as was a loaded firearm and a quantity of
suspected cocaine.
The subject vehicle was a rental car, which the defendant had
rented after flying to Arizona from Utah, which was additional
evidence to establish probable cause that the defendant was a drug
courier.

If the Court finds that Mangelson had sufficient probable

cause, then he did not need a search warrant pursuant to the principals
of the Carroll doctrine and the recent case of the U.S. v. Ross.
He could also remove the vehicle to the Juab County Public
Safety Building

to provide a location for a more convenient search,

pursuant to State v. Shields.
The other lawful basis for the search was pursuant to the written
policy and procedures of tie highway patrol to make inventory searches
of all vehicles brought into the custody and control of the highway
patrol after a custodial arrest.

Similiar inventory searches have

been upheld by this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court in the cases
cited herein above.
The lower court therefore erred in granting defendant's Motion
to Suppress, in that the warrantless search of the trunk of the defendant's vehicle was not a violation of his constitutional rights under
either the Utah or U.S. Constitution.
POINT 2.

EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE SUBJECT EVIDENCE WAS UNLAW-

FULLY SEIZED, IT SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT A
SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMEM3MEHP RIGHTS
AND THE POLICE OFFICERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH.
Section 78-16-5 U.C.A. 1953 as amended states:

"No evidence

which is otherwise competent and admissible shall be excluded from
any criminal proceeding because of the violation of the Iburth
Amendment rights, except evidence which, though otherwise admissible
was secured in a method which involved a substantial violation of
Iburth Amendment rights as provided in subsection 77-35-12

(g)".

Subsection 77-35-12 (g) states:
(1)

In any motion concerning the admissibility of evidence or
the suppression of evidence pursuant to this section or at
trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the suppression of evidence shall not be granted unless the court
finds the violation upon which it is based to be both a
substantial violation and not committed in good faith. The
court shall set forth its reasons for such finding .

(2)

An unlawful search or seizure shall in all cases be deemed
substantial if one or more of the following is established
by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the evidence:

(i)

The violation was grossly negligent, willful, malicious,
shocking to the conscience of the court or was a result
of the practice of the law enforcement agency pursuant to a
general order of that agency;

(ii)

The violation was intended only to harass without legitimate
law enforcement purposes.

(3)

In determining whether a peace officer was acting in good
faith under this section, the court shall consider, in
addition to any other relevant factors, some or all of the
following:

(i)

The extent of deviation from legal search and seizure standards;

(ii)

The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future
violations of search and seizure standards;

(iii) Whether or not the officer was proceeding by way of a search
warrant, arrest warrant, or relying on previous specific
direction of a magistrate or prosecutor; or
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded.
Eefore the lower court should have suppressed and excluded the
subject evidence it should have found

both that there was a "substantial

violation" of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and that the
police officers did not act in "good faith" pursuant to the defination
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of each of those terms in the above cited

section of the Utah Code

of Criminal Procedure.
If the Court does for sane reason find there was a violation of
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, that violation clearly does
not come within the definition of a substantial violation. The search
was made of a leased vehicle after the lawful custodial arrest of
the defendant. The defendant could not have had a very high expectation of privacy

for the items contained in said trunk. There is

evidence that any violation found was grossly negligent, willful,
malicious or shocking to the conscience of the court. The search
was the result of the practice of the law enforcement agency pursuant
to to a general order, but such practice of inventory searches has
been upheld numerous times by this Court.

Further the search had

a legitimate law enforcement purpose as set forth above and was not
intended only to harass the defendant.
The police officers were acting in good faith as defined by section
77-35-12. They would have violated highway patrol policy if they
had not had the vehicle towed into Nephi and had not made an
inventory search of the vehicle. The initial arrest of the defendant
was not a pretext to enable the search of the vehicle. Trooper
Mangelson merely followed proper police investigative techniques,
and it was the defendant's actions that placed him in a position where
his vehicle could be lawfully searched.
It is true that the officers considered obtaining a search
warrant, but when it became apparent

that they could not readily

obtain one because the county attorney and both available justice of the
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peace were out of town, and the fact the defendant could readily
bail out of jail on the misdemeanor charges and retrieve his
vehicle, the officers correctly chose to conduct the constitutionally
sound inventory search.
The constitutionality of Section 78-16-5 has not been ruled
upon by this Court. The principle upon which section is based, that
of limiting the effect of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary to those
cases where there has been a substantial violation of a person's
Etwrth Amendment rights and the officers did not act in good fath,
was recently upheld in the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States
v. Leon, 82 L. Ed. 2 n d 677 (1984).

In that case the Supreme Court

held that the exclusionary rule does not bar the use by the prosecutor
of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance, on
a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but
ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.
If the Court does find that there was a violation of the
defendant's Eburth Amendment rights, any violation was not substantial,
and the officers were acting in good faith. The lcwer court erred in
finding a substantial violation and that the officers did not
act in good faith. The decision of the lower court should be
reversed and the subject evidence should not be excluded.
CONCLUSION
The search and seizure of the thirty-three pounds of marijuana
from the defendant's vehicle did not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights under either the Utah or United States Constitution.

The

warrantless search of the vehicle may be justified under the Carroll
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doctrine, in that the officers had probable cause to search the trunk
for marijuana. The warrantless search may also be justified as a
proper police inventory search after the custodial arrest of the
defendant.
Even if the court finds a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights, any violation was not substantial and the
officers acted in good faith by following the Utah Highway Patrol
policies with respect to inventory searches. Therefore pursuant to
Section 78-16-5 U.C.A. the evidence should not have been suppressed by
the lower court.
Based upon the foregoing,

this Court should reverse the Order

of the Fourth Judicial District Court granting the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress, and permit the introduction of the two plastic
garbage bags containing the thirty-three pounds of marijuana as
evidence.
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